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ESSAY
A Better Way to Revive Glass-Steagall
John Crawford"
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 repeatedly forced regulators to face
terrible choices between risking catastrophic contagion by letting particular
firms or markets fail, and intervening to bail them out. 1 One explanation of
why these dilemmas arose was that financial firms were "too big to fail." Nearly
a decade after the onset of the crisis, the major financial conglomerates in the
United States are in many cases larger than they were in 2007.2 Figures as
politically diverse as Donald Trump, Elizabeth Warren, John McCain, and
Bernie Sanders all agree on a (partial) remedy: the revival of the Glass-Steagall
Act, the Depression-era law that placed a firewall between the activities of
commercial banks and investment banks.3 By revival," supporters mean
reinstating Glass-Steagall's provisions prohibiting investment banks from
affiliating with depository institutions-a prohibition that was eliminated in
Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law.
1. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 280-
386 (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcic-reports/
fcic-finaLreportfull.pdf (describing a series of such dilemmas during 2008).
2. For example, total assets for JPMorgan Chase & Co. came to S 1.562 trillion at year end
2007, and to S2.49 trillion at the end of 2016. SeeJPMorgan Chase & Co., 2016 Annual
Report (Form 10-K) 43 (2017), https://investor.shareholder.com/common/
download/sec.cfm?CompanylD=ONE&FID=19617-17-314&CIK=19617; JPMorgan
Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26 (2008), https://
investor.shareholder.com/common/download/sec.cfm?CompanylD=ONE&FID= 119
3125-08-43536&CIK=19617.
3. "Glass-Steagall" refers to the Banking Act of 1933, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377
(1998) (repealed 1999) (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378(a) (2015)). Regarding
popular support for a return to the law, see Donna Borak, Elizabeth Warren and Trump
Agree on One Thing: Break Up the Banks, CNNMONEY (Apr. 7, 2017, 2:46 PM ET),
http://cnnmon.ie/2o57qnb (reporting that Warren reintroduced a bill with McCain
and two other senators to reinstate Glass-Steagall, and quoting an analyst's view that
"[a]t some point the market is going to have to accept that the Trump administration
is serious about restoring the Glass-Steagall separation between commercial and
investment banking"); Kevin Cirilli, Sanders Backs Reviving Glass-Steagall, THEHILL
(Jul. 7, 2015,6:39 PM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/248407-sanders-backs-
reviving-glass-steagall (reporting on Sanders's support for a return to Glass-Steagall).
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1999.4 Splitting up behemoth conglomerates such as Citigroup and JP Morgan
that engage in both investment and commercial banking would, they believe,
help solve the too-big-to-fail problem and prevent future bailout dilemmas. 5
This Essay advances several claims in opposition to this narrative. First, in
addressing the bailout problem, the size of individual firms is far less important
than the existence of vast amounts of short-term, "runnable" debt outside the
traditional banking sector.6 Bailouts occur because regulators fear the knock-
on effects of a firm's failure. The severity of those knock-on effects is driven
more by the type of claims that suffer losses due to a firm's failure than by the
magnitude of a firm's first-order losses. Imposing losses on short-term creditors
tends to generate vicious externalities that typically do not arise when long-
term creditors and equity claimants absorb losses. The phenomenon of non-
depository institutions issuing oceans of short-term debt defines the "shadow
banking" system, which lay at the heart of the crisis of 2007-2008. Second, a
different provision of Glass-Steagall, one that has never been repealed,
attempted to address the shadow banking problem, with less and less success as
the decades wore on. The provision, Section 21 of Glass-Steagall, prohibits
investment banks from receiving deposits,9 the paradigmatic example of
runnable debt. This prohibition was a key ingredient in preventing panics
during the middle decades of the twentieth century.' 0 Unfortunately, the
4. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 20, 32, which prohibited affiliation between deposit-taking
institutions and investment banks, were repealed by the Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999 (popularly known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). Pub. L.
No. 106-102,§§ 101-103, 113 Stat. 1341-51 (1999).
5. See Cirilli, supra note 3 (quoting Sanders's public statement that "if we are truly serious
about ending too big to fail, we have got to break up the largest financial institutions in
this country"). A related reason sometimes proffered for reviving Glass-Steagall is the
need to protect "ordinary" commercial banking from "risky" investment banking. See,
e.g., Borak, supra note 3. This rationale is less compelling given the significant
quantitative and qualitative constraints on transactions between banks and non-bank
affiliates effected by Federal Reserve Act §§ 23A and 23B. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1
(2015). But see Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971) (describing more
"subtle hazards" that may arise from the affiliation).
6. See generally Jack Bao et al., The Runnables, FEDS NOTES (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015 /the-runnables-
20150903.html (measuring runnable liabilities in the U.S. economy).
7. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text; see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Some
Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response, Speech at the Russell Sage
Foundation and the Century Foundation Conference on "Rethinking Finance"
(Apr. 13, 2012) (noting that first-order stock market losses following the dot-com crash
were as large as the peak-to-trough decline in all residential real estate from 2006-2011
and attributing the more severe impact of the housing crash to the fact that it triggered
a banking panic).
8. See generally MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL
REGULATION (2016) (providing an account of shadow banking and the crisis).
9. Banking Act of 1933 § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2015).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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narrow way in which Section 21 defined deposits ultimately allowed
investment banks, in the years leading up to the crisis, to comply with the letter
of the law while violating its spirit-a loophole they ruthlessly exploited." They
did so by issuing short-term debt instruments that did not fall within the
technical definition of "deposit," but that served, for institutional investors
looking for a place to park their cash, as the functional equivalent of deposits.12
If Section 21 had targeted not only deposits, but also any instruments
designed to serve the same economic function as deposits, its enforcement
would have gone a long way to eliminating the key vulnerabilities that spawned
the crisis. From a stability perspective, it is much more important to effectuate
the spirit of the prohibition on investment banks receiving deposits than it is to
try to prevent commercial and investment banks from sharing a common
corporate parent. A better way to revive Glass-Steagall, then, would be to
bolster Section 21 rather than to reenact the anti-affiliation provisions.
I. Background on Glass-Steagall
The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name for four provisions of the
Banking Act of 1933,13 aimed at separating the activities of commercial banks14
and investment banks.1 5 Sections 20 and 32 prohibited commercial banks and
investment banks from affiliating with each other.16 These prohibitions were
repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. '7 Sections 16 and 21 of
Glass-Steagall, on the other hand, relate to the activities investment banks and
commercial banks themselves are allowed to engage in: Section 16 prohibits
11. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
12. Id.
13. See supra note 3.
14. Commercial banks are the most prominent type of (and should be understood here as
a synonym for) depository institution. For an account of the (complicated) history of
legal entities that have been deemed a "bank" for purposes of the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA) of 1956, see Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That
Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the
United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 138-88 (2011).
15. Investment banks are not depository institutions, but specialize in classic Wall Street
activities such as underwriting securities offerings, acting as market makers, and
advising on corporate mergers. See Investment Banking, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investment-banking.asp (last visited May 17, 2017).
16. See Banking Act of 1933, §§ 20, 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (1998) (repealed 1999). The
original rationale for the anti-affiliation provisions was not based on size, but on the
possibility of conflicts of interest and a sort of "brand confusion" by retail customers.
See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971) (describing Congress's
focus on the "subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the
business of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the investment banking
business either directly or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular
investments").
17. See supra note 4.
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commercial banks from engaging in investment banking activities such as
underwriting and dealing in securities, 18 and Section 21 prohibits investment
banks from receiving deposits.' 9 These provisions have not been repealed, and
remain the law of the land.
This means that prior to 1999, an investment bank could neither receive
deposits nor affiliate with a firm that could-for example, by sharing a
corporate parent. After 1999, investment banks still cannot receive deposits,
but they can affiliate with firms that do. Thus, for example, JPMorgan Chase &
Co., a holding company, can own as subsidiaries both JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., a commercial bank, and J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC, an investment
bank.20 Only the commercial bank, however, can receive deposits, and only the
commercial bank is covered by deposit insurance. 2 1 Furthermore, the
commercial bank's interactions with affiliated entities are strictly circumscribed
by Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. 22
Those calling for a return to Glass-Steagall seek to reenact the anti-
affiliation provisions that were repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley, so that
JPMorgan Chase & Co. will be forced to divest itself of either its commercial
bank or its investment bank. There are respectable arguments for such an
approach,23 but as an anti-bailout measure, it would be markedly inferior to
putting bite into (the still operative) Section 21.
II. Shadow Banking and the Crisis
The reason Section 21 is important is that it has the potential to address
the problem at the heart of the recent crisis: shadow banking.24 As noted,
shadow banking refers to non-depository institutions funding long-term
18. Banking Act of 1933 § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2015). Note that the arbitrage of this provision
may (or may not) cause problems for the deposit insurance fund, but is less important
than Section 21 from a stability perspective, as the problem of panics is less likely to
strike (insured) commercial banks. See, e.g., infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
19. Banking Act of 1933 § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2015).
20. Fixed Income Information, JPMORGAN CHASE & Co, https://www.jpmorganchase.com/
corporate/investor-relations/fixed-income.htm (last visited May 17, 2017).
21. What's Covered, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/ (last
visited May 17, 2017).
22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2015).
23. See, e.g., Luigi Zingales, Why I Was Won over by Glass-Steagall, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 10, 2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/cb3e52be-b08d- le I -8b36-00144feabdcO (arguing,
among other points, that "Glass-Steagall helped restrain the political power of banks").
24. See generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007
(2010) (explaining the crisis as a classic bank run in a new institutional setting-that of
shadow banks rather than banks).
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investments with lots of short-term debt. 25 This funding structure is a defining
feature of traditional (commercial) banks, and is sometimes referred to as
"maturity transformation." The maturities of a bank's liabilities are
overwhelmingly short, whereas the bank's assets typically have long maturities.
Thus, the bank must repay depositors on demand, but must wait months or
years to be repaid by those who have borrowed from it. This makes the bank
vulnerable to "runs"-that is, en masse withdrawals of depositors' funds. The
bank does not keep depositors' cash in vaults, but lends it out; these loans
cannot be called in and it is often difficult for the bank to sell such loans to
another institution on short notice for full value.26 Runs tend to generate
terrible externalities.27 Widespread runs constitute a panic; panics are the
essence of a financial crisis.28
The fragility of banks' funding structure caused periodic panics throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States.29 The
problem of panics in the traditional banking sector was largely solved by a
combination of (i) deposit insurance to prevent runs and (ii) regulatory
constraints and supervision to address moral hazard concerns arising from
insurance, 30 yielding a long, panic-free period in U.S. history.31 The crisis of
,322007-2008 marked the end of this "Quiet Period." The end came because
banks' fragile funding model had migrated to non-depository institutions such
as investment banks, which lay in the regulatory "shadows," outside the safety
net and without the prudential supervision applied to banks.3 3
25. See RICKS, supra note 8, at ix (noting that while "shadow banking" is used in diverse
ways, to the crisis response team at the U.S. Treasury Department, it meant "the
financial sector's use of vast amounts of short-term debt to fund portfolios of financial
assets").
26. This is true to the degree that banks' assets are not perfectly liquid. See generally John
Crawford, Capital Accounts: Bank Capital, Crises, and the Determinants of an Optimal
Regulatory Approach, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 1161, 1167 (2015) (book review) (explaining
liquid assets).
27. See, e.g., RICKS, supra note 8, at 109-10 (describing the panic crunch in credit availability
that widespread runs cause).
28. Id. at 102-03.
29. See, e.g., THEODORE GILMAN, FEDERAL CLEARING HOUSES 183 (1899) (making the claim
in 1899 that "[s]ince 1793 panics have occurred [in the United States] in the following
years: 1797, 1811, 1813, 1816, 1819, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1884, 1890,
and 1893"); BEN BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 9-10
(2013) (identifying six banking panics between 1873 and 1914).
30. RICKS, supra note 8, at 160-63.
31. See GORTON, supra note 24, at 11.
32. Id.
33. See generally id. at 1-12 (describing the rise of shadow banking and the role it played in
the crisis).
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It is important to note that shadow banks were not created by the repeal of
Sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall 34 : affiliation with a commercial bank is
irrelevant to the question of whether an investment bank or other non-
depository institution is itself functioning as a shadow bank by funding its
activities with large amounts of short-term debt. Thus, the problem with
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns was not that these classic Wall Street
investment banks were affiliated with depository institutions-they were not-
but rather that they served functionally as depository institutions themselves. 35
For example, in the years leading up to the crisis, large institutional investors
who needed a place to park their cash for short periods of time began to eschew
traditional bank accounts and instead make short-term collateralized loans to
these investment banks and others like them. 36 The loans might pay a slightly
higher interest rate and the collateral provided security to the lender. The loans
were functionally just like a deposit-they were short-term, often overnight,
and routinely rolled over until the funds were needed for a particular
transaction, at which point the investment bank could seek out other lenders
to replace the withdrawn funding. 37 Just like traditional banking, this system
served a valuable purpose for those engaging in it, but created vulnerability to
en masse, panicked withdrawals and all the pernicious knock-on effects for the
real economy that such panics generate. 38
Again, the dual "solution" to banks' fragile funding structure-the
combination of a safety net and prudential regulation-does not extend to
shadow banking, which metastasized in the decades leading up to the crisis and
which remains robust today.3 9 History has taught that widespread maturity
34. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 20, 32, 12 U.S.C. § 78, 377 (1998) (repealed 1999) (prohibiting
commercial banks and investment banks from affiliating with each other).
35. See generally RICKS, supra note 8, at 32 (describing the functional equivalence of deposits
and short-term funding used by other financial firms); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,
supra note 1, at 280-91, 324-43 (describing the failures of Lehman Brothers and Bear
Stearns).
36. This type of lending arrangement was called "repo," short for "repurchase agreement."
TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. No. 382,
THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 8 (2009),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr382.pdf ("In a repo, the
borrower sells a security today for a price below the current market price on the
understanding that it will buy it back in the future at a pre-agreed price."); see also FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 103 ("Unlike banks and thrifts with access to
deposits, investment banks relied more on money market funds and other investors for
cash; commercial paper and repo loans were the main sources.").
37. ADRIAN & SHIN, supra note 36, at 6.
38. See, e.g., RICKS, supra note 8, at 106-09.
39. See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 265 fig.3; Volcker All.,
Unfinished Business: Banking in the Shadows 14 fig.1 (2016),
http://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/VolckerAllianceUnf
inishedBusinessBankingInTheShadows.pdf.
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transformation without deposit insurance or its equivalent tends to end in
tears. 40 Avoiding bailouts and achieving stability would therefore be much
better served by prohibiting non-depository institutions such as investment
banks from functioning as de facto depository institutions than it would be by
allowing them to function as such, but prohibiting them from sharing a
corporate parent with de jure depositories.
III. Looking Back and Looking Forward
As noted, Section 21 attempted to address the precise problem adumbrated
above by forbidding investment banks like Lehman Brothers from receiving
deposits.4 ' Section 21 is one of several laws prohibiting non-depository
institutions from receiving deposits.42 The fact that this prohibition was not
heavily arbitraged during the middle decades of the twentieth century43 played
no small role in producing the long, panic-free Quiet Period.
By the 1990s, however, investment banks had begun ruthlessly to exploit a
flaw in Section 21 (and similar prohibitions). The flaw is that the provision
relies on a very narrow, formalistic definition of "deposit."45 Section 21
prohibits investment banks 4 6 from receiving "deposits subject to check or to
repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other
evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor."47 The types of short-term
credit with which investment banks were funding themselves prior to the
crisis-and with which they continue to fund themselves -did not fall within
the literal prohibition of Section 21, but served precisely the same economic
function, and created the same risks, as the instruments that were covered by
Section 21.
Protecting the financial system is first and foremost about panic
prevention.4 9 It is virtually impossible to have vast amounts of uninsured
short-term debt funding long-term investments without creating the risk of
40. RICKS, supra note 8, at 160-63.
41. Banking Act of 1933 § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2015).
42. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 131 (McKinney 2017).
43. See, e.g., Gorton & Metric, supra note 39, at 261, 265 fig.3.
44. See GORTON, supra note 24, at 11.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (2015); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1) (2015).
46. More precisely, the prohibition applies to "any person, firm, corporation, association,
business trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing,
underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate
participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities." 12 U.S.C.
§ 378(a)(1).
47. Id.
48. Volcker All., supra note 39, at 14 fig.1.
49. See, e.g., RICKS, supra note 8, at 102.
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panic.50 The first step to recapturing the conditions that led to the Quiet Period,
then, is to limit widespread maturity transformation to insured depositories.
An important move in this direction would be to amend Section 21 of Glass-
Steagall to prohibit investment banks from receiving deposits or the economic
equivalent of deposits, defined functionally as a short-term debt claim.5 1
Conclusion
Shadow banking caused the crisis of 2007-2008: the run on the shadow
banking system transformed what would otherwise have been a large but
hardly unusual crash in asset prices into a macroeconomic catastrophe. Bailout
decisions were driven largely by a desperate desire to stop the panic. The best
way to try to prevent a recurrence is to tackle shadow banking, not to prohibit
shadow banks from affiliating with commercial banks. If Section 21's
prohibition were enforced in broadly functional terms, it would not matter
much from a stability perspective whether investment banks, even giant ones,
affiliate with commercial banks, as their failure would be unlikely to spark a
panic. As long as investment banks are engaged in shadow banking, on the
other hand, prohibiting them from having the same corporate parent as
commercial banks will do little to promote stability.
A revival of Glass-Steagall holds promise for stabilizing the system and
ending the implicit government guarantees enjoyed by large non-depository
financial institutions. But the revival should focus on bolstering Section 21,
which remains on the books, rather than reenacting its repealed provisions.
50. See, e.g., id.at 142, 215 (describing panics as a "pathology of short-term debt," and noting
that the advent of deposit insurance brought unprecedented stability to the U.S.
financial system until "emergence on a huge scale of shadow banking").
51. Id. at 230-37.
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